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If timeliness were the sole measure of a book’s value,then Negotiating Asylum should be worth much morethan its weight in gold.  For not only are the numbers
of people who are displaced from their countries of ori-
gin alarming, but refugee-receiving states have for a while
now displayed an ever-increasing propensity for creativ-
ity and doggedness in their single-minded efforts at de-
flecting and excluding protection seekers from their
territories. This much is evident, even from the very title
of Noll’s extremely important intervention in this hither-
to under-studied area. And despite its focus on the states
that constitute the European Union (), Noll’s book
should be of interest to scholars, policy makers, and prac-
titioners the world over.
Negotiating Asylum sets off with brief narrations of
three historical cases of refugee protection. The first,
which concerns the  German laws that began the de-
fining, marginalizing, and eventually excluding and de-
humanizing of German Jews, reminds us all of the ways
in which the construction of a discrete ethnic or racial
group as a social, political, economic, or health “threat” to
the mainstream population of a country almost invari-
ably leads to the exclusion and dehumanization of that
group. This is an important warning, even in contempo-
rary Canada, where it is becoming somewhat fashionable
(again) to justify attempts at disproportionately exclud-
ing certain groups of people from Canadian soil on the
basis that they constitute “threats” to the “security,”
health, or some other vital interest of Canadians. It is an
argument for the exercise of extreme caution when de-
ploying such justificatory rhetoric.
The second narrative concerns the  Swiss–German
agreement controlling the entry of German Jews into
Switzerland just when they had begun to flee the intoler-
able conditions to which they were then being subjected
by the Nazis. This account also reminds us of the ways in
which too many richly endowed states too often stand
aside and do nothing, or very little, to protect protection
seekers who are fleeing the most intolerable conditions
imaginable. It also highlights the tragic paradox that,
more often than not, it is precisely at the moment that a
sharp rise occurs in the protection needs of persons from
a particular country (the moment of greatest need) that
potential countries of refuge impose border controls, visa
requirements, carrier sanctions, and all kinds of pre-entry
and post-entry demands and conditions, all designed to
stem the numbers of those arriving at the edges of their
territories in order to seek protection. And this is so, de-
spite international agreements that impose obligations
on such states to protect a class of such persons in need of
asylum. As Noll argues, the imposition of such pre-entry
and post-entry conditions amount to devices aimed at
preventing protection seekers from being in a position to
file protection claims in the relevant country, and may in
fact violate the international legal obligations of such
states.
The third narrative concerns Sweden’s imposition of
visa requirements on citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina in
, shortly after granting permanent residence to a
large group of Bosnian protection seekers. The latter act
led the rest of Europe to similarly impose restrictions on
the entry of Bosnian citizens. This difficult situation was
exacerbated by Croatia’s decision a year earlier to close its
borders to Bosnian refugees, despite the fact that it was
the main refugee-receiving country in that conflict re-




The eu Acquis, Extraterritorial Protection and the Common Market of Deflection

Gregor Noll
The Hague: Kluwer International, 2000
643 pages, including appendices and bibliography
66
Volume 19 Refuge Number 6
similar to those already articulated when describing the
second narrative.
The book also discusses more normative and interpre-
tive deflection and exclusion devices that have been
widely deployed by  states. For one, it calls attention to
the inimical uses they make of the “safe third country”
concept. States understand (or interpret) this concept to
require that if the protection seeker could have sought
protection in a “safe” third country through which she
passed, her claim shall be rejected, and she shall be re-
turned to that third country. Under the scheme on which
this concept is based, such a protection seeker’s fate is de-
termined by the nature of her travel route and other
allocative factors (stated in the Dublin Convention), thus
denying her the right to choose the country in which to
lodge her application for protection. Part of the genius of
this book is the convincing ways in which it debunks the
“efficiency”-based logic that underlies this regime of de-
flection and shows how its implementation leads too of-
ten not just to results that are manifestly absurd, but as
well to the possible endangerment of protection seekers.
Noll’s point is appreciated even better when one consid-
ers that in Europe, as in much of the rest of the world, the
success or failure of one’s application for protection de-
pends all too often on the luck of the draw—on the iden-
tity of the country in which the application is processed
and how that country chooses to interpret the require-
ments of international law in that regard. That is why
there is such a wide variation among  states in the ac-
ceptance rates for protection seekers who are fleeing pre-
cisely the same situations or conditions. Just as
interesting is the fact that none of the inter-European
agreements on the regulation of migration seem to have
much to say about the harmonization of the substantive
normative regime that guides decisions on immigration
control in individual countries.
Similarly, Noll also maps and critiques the ways in
which too many of those protection seekers that have
been lucky to penetrate the fortress of deflection devices
mounted by states, and who have lodged protection
claims in an  state, are denied access to full-fledged ad-
ministrative or judicial procedures for the determination
of their claim. Here the most popular devices deployed by
 states are the concepts of “safe country of origin” and
“manifestly unfounded claim.” Like the other deflection
devices, these ones are also partly aimed at keeping down
the length of time devoted to the determination of pro-
tection claims and to ensuring that the costs associated
with those processes are also reduced. While these objec-
tives are, of course, understandable in the abstract, as
Noll has ably demonstrated, such efficiency “gains” are al-
most always obtained at the cost of deflecting far too
many protection seekers. Viewed in this light, such mea-
sures are, in general, unsupportable.
Another important contribution that the book makes
to the literature in this area is its detailed and thought-
provoking consideration of the inequities of the current
burden-sharing arrangements, one that the  has
long pointed out, and one to which a number of scholars
such as James Hathaway and Alex Neve have already de-
voted some attention. Noll highlights the need for a more
equitable burden-sharing arrangement among states by
pointing out the fact that Iran, for instance, bears the
grossly disproportionate burden of sheltering over  mil-
lion refugees, while Germany (which is by far richer)
shelters just over  million refugees. We might even add
that a much poorer state like Tanzania shelters an even
greater number of refugees. By pointing out and seeking
ways to ameliorate these gross inequities, Noll delivers a
sharp, if unintended, rebuke to many in Canada (one of
the world’s richest countries) who seem to believe that
each new refugee who appears at the Canadian border is
one too many.
As admirable as Noll’s substantive work in this book is,
his scholarly approach to the material is also commend-
able. It is quite evident to the reader that Noll has strived
to be fair and balanced in his presentation. He describes
and critiques the protection mechanisms that states have
adopted, as well as the devices that states deploy to ensure
the deflection of protection seekers from their territories,
from the perspective of the state as well as from the per-
spective of the protection seeker. He has tried very hard
to present an objective analysis of the opposing views,
with the goal of finding a workable middle course that
might meet the practical difficulties faced when protec-
tion is unavailable to those who need it most. For this
reason, and many more, his work is likely to be a useful
resource to all of those interested in this area.
However, despite its obvious and considerable strength
as a piece of scholarly writing, the book may be seen as
deficient in one or two respects. At the outset, Noll de-
clares that the book is “a work on law, using the language
of law.” This statement is understandable, of course. But
in toeing too faithfully a “legal” line, Noll’s work leaves
the reader with the impression (intended or otherwise)
that it is easy in this area to neatly separate legal analysis
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from other related forms of analysis, especially those
common in the other social sciences. While we believe
that this impression is somewhat misleading, ours is not
merely a methodological quibble. We are convinced that
this mindset might have been responsible for the fact that
Noll did not grapple as much as he should have with the
non-legal factors, structures, and stories that undergird
and shape the turn within  states to what he aptly
terms “a common market of deflection.” That these sto-
ries, structures, and factors have a high level of explana-
tory power, even within a “legal” piece of writing, is
almost palpable. For instance, if Noll’s ambition is to in-
spire in some way a transformation in this regime of de-
flection, it becomes relevant whether or not legal regimes
of deflection largely owe their creation to the fears associ-
ated with the effects of non-legal factors such as eco-
nomic depression, or are chiefly a matter of racial or
cultural xenophobia, or of both. If any one of these per-
mutations is correct, then it may not be as fruitful as we
think to invest all of our scarce time in critiquing the na-
ture of the legal regime of deflection. For, in this case, the
nature of the legal texts that create a regime of deflection
do not matter as much as the willingness of the adminis-
trative tribunals or policy implementers to adopt the
most restrictive of the several possible interpretations of
the legal text. And this willingness, and often zeal, to read
the text in the most restrictive way possible, or to read it
as authorizing a device of deflection when it could be
read otherwise, is hardly ever rooted in the nature of the
text itself but in social attitudes and pressures, and in the
particular state’s self-understanding (as constructed in
public discourse). This is not to suggest that “legal” analy-
sis is not possible, but to argue that, in this case at least,
legal analysis would have benefited tremendously from a
less marginalized consideration of the social, economic,
and cultural determinants of interpretive, policy, and ad-
judicative behaviour.
Also largely missing in Noll’s work is a paradox that
might help us understand not just refugee law discourse,
but also international law and international human rights
discourses. This paradox relates to the inconsistent un-
derstandings of sovereignty among  states. It is inter-
esting to note that from Noll’s account, the area of
refugee law (and migration law) is perhaps the one where
European states still hold doggedly to the sovereignties!
Despite their adoption of several regional international
instruments in this area, it is quite clear to the reader that
most of the devices that European states use to deflect
potential protection seekers from their territories are
firmly grounded in the self-image of these states as
Westphalian sovereigns. This is so, despite their insistence
in other international forums that the affirmation of sov-
ereignty so notable among Third World states is now an
unqualified anachronism. The question then is, Why do
 states still hold on so tightly to their own sovereign
rights to exclude (mostly Third World) protection seek-
ers? This is also another example of how a more socio-le-
gal analysis might be important to a project like Noll’s,
because a possible explanation for this paradox is that 
states, just like other states, will deploy their self-images
as sovereign states when these states perceive that social,
economic, and political factors so necessitate. Here again,
if the sovereignty of  states is an obstacle of sorts to the
effective protection of protection seekers, it is because
such extra-legal factors have shaped a mindset that makes
the deployment of sovereignty a necessity.
Again, despite these inadequacies, the book remains an
excellent piece of scholarly writing, one that makes an
original and timely contribution to the relevant litera-
ture. We suspect that most scholars and activists will
surely find much to concur with, and little to dissent
from, in this meticulously written and extremely well
thought-out volume. While we cannot say the same with
as much confidence for many policy implementers in 
states and beyond, some of them will be impressed by
Noll’s thoroughness and balanced presentation. It is a
book that is not meant only to inform and educate, but
also to provoke and challenge. It can also be seen as a
form of encouragement to those working in the field of
refugee protection to continue with their relentless
struggles for a more humane protection regime. For al-
though there is a great deal of knowledge of the notorious
tendency common among many  states towards “de-
flection” of protection seekers, not only does this book
exhaustively substantiate that critique, it also proposes
concrete and practical means of influencing urgent re-
forms, no matter how seemingly far-fetched and difficult.
We highly recommend it to all those who are interested in
the subject of asylum and migration law.
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